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Abstract 
Based on the classic behavioural theory “the Theory of Planned Behaviour”, we develop an 
agent-based model to simulate the diffusion of smart metering technology in the electricity 
market. We simulate the emergent adoption of smart metering technology under different 
management strategies and economic regulations. Our research results show that in terms of 
boosting the take-off of smart meters in the electricity market, choosing the initial users on a 
random and geographically dispersed basis and encouraging meter competition between energy 
suppliers can be two very effective strategies. We also observe an “S-curve” diffusion of smart 
metering technology and a “lock-in” effect in the model. The research results provide us with 
insights as to effective policies and strategies for the roll-out of smart metering technology in 
the electricity market.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Technology adoption, which studies the acceptance and diffusion of a new technology 
in a market or an economy, is an important research area in several disciplines such as 
marketing, management, industrial engineering and economics [1]. Although the 
invention of a new technology often comes into being as a single discrete event or a 
jump, the adoption of that technology often appears as a continuous, long and slow 
process [2]. A new technology will contribute little in a market or economy until it has 
been adopted by many users. Therefore, understanding the process of the diffusion of a 
new technology is of great significance. Rosenberg [3] points out two characteristics in 
the technology diffusion process: overall slowness and wide variations in the rates of 
acceptance of different technologies. Rogers [4] theorizes a classical technology 
diffusion model—the S-curve model of spreading innovations, which suggests that the 
early users adopt a new technology first, followed by the majority, until the technology 
becomes common. This model has been successfully justified by studying the 
adoptions of new technologies in many industries (e.g. [5, 6]). Currently the studies of 
the diffusion of new technologies mainly focus on econometric models (e.g. [7, 8, 9]). 
However, as suggested in the Punctuated-Equilibrium Model of Technology Diffusion 
[1], the diffusion of a new technology is a complex process influenced by a broad range 
of factors, such as organizational inertia, stable industry constellations, cultural 
“openness” and uncertainty in the evolution of the new technology. Davis et al. [10] 
also point out that the acceptance of a new technology is highly related to consumers’ 
psychological factors such as “perceived usefulness” and “perceived ease of use”. 
Therefore, complexity science which studies how the micro-level individual behaviour 
gives rise to the macro-level collective properties of a whole system appears to be 
another effective means of studying the influences of factors in the complex process of 
the diffusion of a new technology. 
 
In this paper, we present an agent-based model to study the adoption of smart metering 
technology in the electricity consumer market. The motivation of the study is triggered 
by the fact that the future of smart metering technology in the UK energy consumer 
market remains a key concern of the government (e.g. the Department for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (DBERR)), the energy market regulator (the Office 
of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem)), as well as energy suppliers and consumers. 
We target the issue by using agent-based computational simulation, i.e. we build a 
virtual society being comprised of rational software objects, the “intelligent agents”, in 
a computer. These agents, representing both energy consumers and energy suppliers, 
interact in the virtual society. As with real households, the energy consumer agents 
make rational decisions in terms of choosing energy suppliers and metering 
technologies in the virtual society. Macro-level emergent properties, such as the 
evolution of the adoption of smart metering technology in the virtual society, can be 
seen as inferences of the adoption of smart metering technology in the real electricity 
consumer market.   
 
The objectives of the study are twofold. First, we aim to provide an exploratory and 
predictive study of the future of smart metering technology in the UK electricity 
consumer market. Currently all the stakeholders, especially the government (DBERR), 
energy market regulator (Ofgem) and energy suppliers, are all interested in promoting 
smart meters in the UK energy consumer market. However, a wide range of barriers and 
uncertainties make the future of smart meters unclear. A robust exploratory and 
predictive model can provide very helpful management intelligence for these 
stakeholders. In other words, the results from the model could potentially help 
decision-makers see the future of smart metering technology and establish effective 
strategies and economic regulations to push the take-off of smart meters in the UK 
energy consumer market.  
 
The second objective of the paper is to develop an effective multi-agent system 
framework on the basis of the classical psychological/behavioural theories to study all 
the complex phenomena in the energy consumer market. This model can be seen as a 
generic multi-agent framework based on which we can study the influences of a 
number of factors (e.g. word-of-mouth effects in a social network, consumers’ 
perceptions, and the impact of random events) on the issues of most concern (e.g. issues 
about energy security, technology adoption and global warming) in the energy 
consumer market. For example, if we detach the model from smart metering 
technology and apply it to another issue, such as the diffusion of renewable energy 
technologies, it will still be an effective research approach. Moreover, because a key 
point in the development of the model—designing algorithms to control the behaviour 
and interactions of the electricity consumer agents, is based on the classical 
psychological/behavioural theories, the model can also be seen as another way of 
validating the classical psychological/behavioural theory.     
 
The paper is comprised of six sections. The second section describes smart metering 
technology and its current situation of adoption. The third section describes our 
agent-based simulation model of smart metering technology adoption in detail. The 
fourth section describes the four scenarios we simulated with the model. The fifth 
section concentrates on the analysis of the simulation results and their practical 
implications. The sixth section presents a discussion of the model and concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Smart Metering Technology and Its Current Situation of Adoption 
 
2.1 What is a Smart Meter? 
 
“Smart meter” is a catch-all term for a type of advanced and innovative meter (usually 
an electric meter) which offers consumers information about consumption in more 
detail than a traditional meter, and optionally interacts with local utility suppliers via 
some network for monitoring and billing purposes [11]. It could range from a simple 
display meter which shows consumers how much they spent on the utility, to a 
high-technology meter which automatically interacts with utility suppliers so as to send 
accurate meter readings to utility suppliers remotely or help consumers keep track of 
the carbon emissions caused by their energy consumption [12]. 
 
Although currently there is no single unified definition of a “smart meter”, some 
commonly recognised functions are available: 
 
• Display real time information about energy consumption to consumers and send 
it to energy suppliers directly and remotely [13]; 
 
• Provide a more effective way for consumers to understand their energy 
consumption via a prominent display unit which includes: 
 
- Cost in £/p 
- Indicator of low/med/high use, 
- Comparison with historic/average consumption patterns, 
- Function to allow data to be accessed via PCs/mobile phones [13]. 
 
• Interact with energy suppliers so as to make it is possible for consumers to 
switch tariffs remotely [12, 13]; 
 
• Export metering for domestic micro-generators [13, 14]; 
 
• Enhance demand-side management options, such as tariffs which charge more 
at peak times of the day and less for off-peak times [15]; 
 
• Ensure security of energy supply, inactivity monitoring and real time 
monitoring of gas leaks and CO2 emissions [12, 13]; 
 
2.2 Benefits of Smart Meters 
 Smart metering technology can potentially offer a broad range of benefits including 
better information and control of energy use, new service opportunities for companies 
and other organizations, enhanced power network management facilities, and 
alternative connections to digital services. These benefits are in line with government’s 
objectives to reduce emissions, keep energy prices competitive, and to encourage 
electronic trading [13]. The potential benefits that smart meters bring to different 
stakeholders are outlined below in detail. 
 
• Energy Efficiency 
 
As a basic function, a smart meter can display energy consumption accurately in 
pounds and pence so that consumers can easily be made aware of the money 
they are spending on energy. The display is often located in a separate place 
from where the meter is installed, e.g. in the kitchen or next to the thermostat, in 
order to provide consumers with easy access to the information [13]. More 
sophisticated smart meters can interact with electrical appliances around the 
home and display the exact amount of energy they use, or even control the 
amount of energy use in a house.   
 
A significant body of evidence has proven that consumers’ behaviour would 
change if they were regularly informed of the cost of energy they consume [14, 
16]. Therefore, arming consumers with better information about their energy 
consumption could change their behaviour. For example, they may try to find 
ways of saving money by cutting back on the amount of overall energy they 
consume, or by reducing energy consumption at peak times. As a result, 
consumers with smart meters could be more energy efficient. This has been 
witnessed by studies and experience from overseas including Italy, Ontario, 
Northern Ireland and Sweden: changes of consumer behaviour have resulted in 
a reduction of energy consumption by between 3% and 15% [16], with “savings 
at the upper end often being linked to the provision of energy efficiency 
information and advice” [13]. Ofgem’s analysis based on limited UK 
information has shown that smart meters could have the potential to deliver, on 
an annual basis, a reduction in domestic fuel bills by an average of £24 and, if 
applied in all household, a reduction in overall UK gas and electricity 
consumption of around 3% [14].   
 
• Demand-side Management, Micro-generations and Cutting Emissions 
 
As reported by Energywatch, demand-side management measures and 
micro-generation technologies can facilitate the establishment of an effective 
and competitive energy market that delivers reduced carbon emissions, secure 
energy suppliers and affordable energy for all consumers [13]. Demand-side 
management enables energy suppliers to offer consumers variable rate contracts 
which encourage consumers to use energy at off-peak demand times of the day 
by offering reduced off-peak rates in exchange for relatively high rates at peak 
demand times of the day. For example, in Italy and Ontario, there are rates for 
three different periods of the day [16]. Demand-side management measures can 
decrease the pressure of the distribution network at peak demand times, and also 
potentially reduce the need for building generating plants to cover the demand 
at peak times [13]. 
 
Micro-generation produces electricity and heat from a low or non-carbon source 
on a domestic scale. Examples of micro-generation include: micro-CHP (a 
small domestic Combined Heat and Power unit which produces electricity and 
heat simultaneously), micro-hydro, micro-wind and photovoltaics. The benefits 
of wind, solar and hydro micro-generation are the zero fuel cost and that the 
technologies are carbon free. The development of micro-generation can 
potentially produce a third of a householder’s annual electricity needs thus 
reducing the load on distribution networks and largely cutting carbon emissions 
[13]. As a result, the total cost to consumers will be reduced. In order to capture 
the benefits from micro-generation, meters must be able to record imported 
electricity from the distribution network and electricity exported back to the 
network during the periods when generation outstrips demand. Therefore, smart 
meters can help boost the spread of micro-generation.  
 
Widespread adoption of smart metering technology can therefore cut CO2 
emissions because: 
 
 “Large uptake of micro-generation would dramatically reduce 
the need for electricity from major CO2 emitting power stations. 
It would also help to smooth out peaks in demand for electricity 
which would in turn reduce emissions from power stations. 
 
 By encouraging customers to adopt energy efficiency measures 
and use less energy, this will also help reduce emissions. 
 
 Smart meters could also show how much carbon a household 
was emitting and this could make customers more aware of the 
impact of their energy use on the environment” [12]. 
 
• Improving Billing Performance 
 
As reported by Energywatch, poor billing is by far the largest source of 
complaints by consumers. In 2004/5, poor billing accounted for 61.5% of all 
domestic consumers’ complaints, equivalent to approximately 40,000 
complaints [13]. Since April 2002, the number of consumers seeking advice 
about billing from Energywatch has increased by 202% [13]. The results from a 
research commissioned by Energywatch in 2003 shows: 
 
• “Consumers lack confidence in the accuracy of estimated bills; 
 
• 35% of customers receive estimated bills frequently; 
 
• One in five believe that the estimated bills they received are very or 
fairly inaccurate; 
 
• Almost one in ten said that estimated billing had pushed them into debt 
with their supplier and for a third of those the debt exceeded £100. For 
one in four of these the debt was difficult or impossible to pay off” [13]. 
 
If there is a suitable information network and infrastructure, smart meters can 
send accurate real time meter readings directly to the energy suppliers. 
Therefore, the adoption of smart meters can potentially eliminate the need for 
manual meter reading and estimated billing. The automatic and remote meter 
reading and accurate billing will lead to a substantial reduction in energy 
suppliers’ back office costs related to complaint resolution [13].  
 
2.3 Barriers to the Adoption of Smart Metering Technology   
 
Despite a number of benefits that could arise from the widespread application of smart 
metering technology, the adoption of this new technology is not yet as good as expected. 
The barriers that have prevented smart metering technology from taking off in the 
energy consumer market can be summarized in three aspects: economic, technical and 
regulatory. 
 
• Economic 
 
As they are based on advanced technologies, smart meters inevitably cost more then 
conventional meters, and the more sophisticated the model, the higher the price. 
Table 1 shows a comparison between the costs of smart meters and the costs of 
conventional meters. On the one hand, for consumers, the cost of a smart meter 
might be up to three times the cost of a conventional meter. On the other hand, 
currently energy suppliers are also unlikely to roll out smart meters in the whole UK 
because they may have to pay around £800 million in total for the deployment of 
smart meters. [14]. Therefore, high absolute cost of replacement of existing 
conventional meters with smart meters remains a significant economic barrier 
preventing smart meters from taking off.   
  
Meter Type Meter Cost Comments 
Standard credit tariff £50-£70 Combined cost of supply and 
installation 
Standard prepayment meter £80-£100 Combined cost of supply and 
installation 
Smart “Display” meter £75-£120 Supply and install. Includes cost 
of display unit. Potentially 
additional costs associated with 
pre-payment token systems. 
Smart “AMR/Net” meter 
(Remote Readable) 
£100-£170 Supply and install. Additional 
infrastructure costs e.g. wireless 
or powerline communications 
systems 
Smart “Internet” meter £150 and upwards Supply and install. Includes costs 
of TCP/IP stack. Additional 
infrastructure costs apply 
directly related to the number of 
additional services carried over 
metering system 
Table 1: Comparative Costs of “SMART” versus “STANDARD” Meters (Source: [14])  
 
• Technical 
 
Although advanced metering technology is already available, there are many 
options in terms of the types of smart meters. The lack of standardization of types of 
smart meters can create risk for energy suppliers: a consumer installing a smart 
meter from one energy supplier may switch to another energy supplier because its 
new smart meters appear to offer more advanced services [14]. Additionally, the 
lack of standardization of smart metering technology means that large number of 
smart meters of different types will work (e.g. collect and dispatch data and 
instructions, keep track of meter errors, validate and transform the data and store 
data) under different communication protocols. Currently, this issue remains a big 
technical challenge for energy suppliers [34]. This barrier is being discussed by 
both Ofgem and Energywatch, who are currently making efforts to publish 
international standards covering automatic meter data exchange [18]. The 
standardization of smart meter technology can overcome this technical barrier and 
enable energy suppliers to boost the deployment of smart meters in large scale. 
 
• Regulatory 
 
With the current regulatory framework, most of the energy meters remain the assets 
of the energy suppliers, and the prime focus of Ofgem has been the development of 
metering competition in the energy market. Ofgem suggests that metering 
competition would advance the interests of consumers by offering more choices, 
encouraging technological innovation and reducing costs for both consumers and 
energy suppliers [19]. However, the combination of RPI-X regulations on the 
ex-PES (the electricity supplier to the extent that the electricity supplier is 
undertaking activities within its distribution services area), and currently 
distribution network operators (DNOs) has the effect of exacerbating the trend to 
install conventional meters with basic functionality, because the regulation can 
incentivise network operators to deliver their existing services as efficiently as 
possible in order to maintain their margins [14]. The electricity network operators 
are reluctant to risk developing innovative services, especially those that can render 
their current assets (existing working meters) obsolete [14]. Furthermore, the 
28-day rule allows consumers to switch their energy suppliers at 28 days notice, 
which causes energy suppliers to face the risk that consumers may not meet their 
debts for the meter or services provided, leaving energy suppliers to chase the debt 
(additionally expenses are incurred for this) [13, 14].  
 
2.4 Current Situation of Smart Metering Technology Adoption in the UK 
 
The domestic metering market in the UK stands at around 45 million units [14]. 
Although all the stakeholders (e.g. DBERR, Ofgem, Energywatch and energy 
consumers) have high expectations with regard to smart meters which can potentially 
offer a broad range of benefits, smart metering technology is not currently taking off in 
the UK. According to Ofgem, some trials have been carried out by energy suppliers (e.g. 
former Seeboard, Severn Trent Water, British Gas and EDF energy), but consumers’ 
acceptance of smart meters does not seem satisfactory [20].  Therefore, the market for 
smart meters in the UK still remains questionable. In order to promote the adoption of 
smart metering technology in the UK, Ofgem has proposed pilot studies and they are 
urging the government to fund the pilots [14]. They suggest that the trials should 
involve a cross section of society, covering for example, inner city housing, affluent 
suburban housing, rural areas and a new residential development, to test (i) the social, 
environmental and consumer benefits of smart meters; (ii) the technical attributes; and 
(iii) the likely costs both to energy suppliers and consumers of the installation and 
maintenance of various types of meters and remote switching of appliances [14]. In 
May 2007, DBERR published a new version of white paper on energy “Meeting the 
Energy Challenge”, which fully addressed the government’s ambition in promoting 
smart metering technology in the UK energy market. In this new energy white paper, 
DBERR announced its new policies on promoting smart meters: (i) energy suppliers 
should extend advanced and smart metering services to all business consumers in Great 
Britain within next 5 years; (ii) a 10-year plan to roll out smart meters to households 
and, between 2008-2010, smart meters will be available free of charge to any 
households that requests one. 
 
3. Description of the Model 
 3.1 The Model 
 
In order to provide an exploratory and predictive study on the adoption of smart 
metering technology in the UK energy consumer market, we propose to incorporate the 
research with computational simulation by developing a multi-agent model to simulate 
the scenarios of the adoption of smart metering technology in the electricity consumer 
market. The idea of the model is that: based on a two-dimensional spatial map, we will 
develop a virtual community within which residential electricity consumers and 
electricity suppliers interact with each other. Each residential consumer can proactively 
gain information about metering technologies and energy suppliers from other 
residential consumers and energy suppliers, and can also proactively send information 
about metering technologies and energy suppliers to other residential consumers.  A 
residential consumer’s decision in terms of choosing metering technology and an 
energy supplier is rationally made based on the information the consumer gains from 
the social network in which it is involved. The rationality in this process of 
decision-making is based on the theory of planned behavivour (TpB) [24]. Energy 
suppliers, on the other hand, will act economically to promote energy and their 
metering technologies including both traditional metering technology and the new 
smart metering technology. Whether energy suppliers “push” or “pull” the smart 
metering technology is economically determined by market situations. The evolution of 
the adoption of smart metering technology with time can be observed from the virtual 
community on system level. By adjusting the parameters, we can test and study the 
influence of management strategies and economic regulations on the adoption of smart 
metering technology. The simulation model can provide us with an in-depth 
understanding of the process of smart metering technology adoption and also assist us 
in predicting the future adoption of smart metering technology. 
 
3.2 The Environment and the Agents 
 
In computational simulation, the environment is a virtual system in which the agents 
behave and interact in a computer. In the model, we create our model based on a square 
lattice of 62500 cells (250*250) with periodic boundary conditions. Cells can either be 
blank or be occupied by residential electricity consumers, as shown in Figure 1. The 
population in the virtual community is determined by an adjustable parameter called 
“population-density”.   
 
 
Figure 1: The Environment 
Note: In the virtual community, residential electricity consumer agents are randomly populated in the cells (blue or yellow houses), 
and the black areas are unpopulated cells (non-residential areas). Each populated cell just has one residential consumer agent, and 
the number of total residential consumer agents is control by the parameter called “population-density”. The blue houses are the 
residential consumer agents with conventional meters, while yellow houses are the initial participating residential consumer agents 
(the residential consumer agents who have been initially chosen to install smart meters) in the pilot programme. In order to 
eliminate edge effects, the square lattice has periodic boundary conditions. 
 
There are two kinds of agents in the virtual community: the residential consumer (RC) 
agents which appear in form of houses, and the energy supplier (ES) agents which are 
not visible but interact with RC agents by disseminating price information of energy 
and smart meters throughout the whole virtual community.    
 
3.3 Behaviour of RC Agents 
 
Since the RC agents are human, they are “smart agents” [21] which have intelligent 
behaviour in terms of choosing energy suppliers and metering technologies. An RC 
agent gains information about energy suppliers and metering technologies from both its 
social network (e.g. neighbours, friends or colleagues) and energy suppliers, processes 
the information and finally makes decisions. This decision-making process is a 
complex cognitive process about which scientists of different backgrounds have given 
different interpretations. For example, in economics, Sugden [22] suggests “rational 
choice” based on the utility theory; in psychology, McClelland [23] develops the 
motivation theory; and in behavioural science, Ajzen [24] develops the theory of 
planned behaviour (TpB). In terms of constructing human agents in an agent-based 
model, the theories based on which we develop algorithms to control the human agents’ 
behaviour are significantly important because they determine the fidelities of the agents. 
Previous work on agent-based simulations in the electricity market (e.g. [25, 26]) 
developed algorithms to control agents’ behaviour based on economic theories. In our 
model, we focus on behavioural science and develop algorithms to control RC agents’ 
behaviour on the basis of the most influential decision-making model “The Theory of 
Planned Behaviour (TpB)” [24].   
 
The TpB model [24], as shown in Figure 2, suggests that intention is the immediate 
antecedent of an actual behaviour of a person and it comes from three sources: the 
person’s attitude towards the behaviour, the influence the person perceives from his/her 
social network (the subjective norm), and the person’s perception of his/her ability to 
perform the behaviour (the perceived behavioural control, which may be facilitated or 
impeded by unexpected or random events). External stimuli’s contributions to the three 
sources of intention are calibrated by their relevant parameters (e.g. behavioural beliefs, 
normative beliefs or control beliefs, which are referred to as a person’s personality 
traits). 
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Figure 2: The model of TpB (Source: Ajzen, 1991, p. 181) 
 
We draw on the ideas of the TpB model. In the virtual community, an RC agent has two 
kinds of interactions (Figure 3). One kind, in the form of price information of energy 
and smart meters, is the interaction between the RC agent and ES agents. The other kind, 
in the form of word-of-mouth effects, is the interaction between the RC agent and other 
RC agents. As competition between suppliers in the energy supply market has so far 
been based primarily on price comparison [14], the price information of electricity and 
smart meters can determine the RC agent’s attitude towards its behaviour—choosing a 
smart meter or not, and from which energy supplier. Therefore, based on the TpB model, 
the price information of electricity and smart meters can been seen as the external 
stimuli related to “behavioural beliefs”. The influences from the RC agent’s social 
network through word-of-mouth effects can positively or negatively trigger the RC 
agent’s intention to make a decision on whether to choose a smart meter or not, and 
from which energy supplier. Therefore, they can be seen as the external stimuli related 
to “normative beliefs” in the TpB model. Energy and technology policies made by 
Ofgem or DBERR are the external factors that can facilitate consumer’s decisions on 
choosing smart meters. Thus these policy effects can be seen as external stimuli related 
to “control beliefs” in the TpB model. 
 
Figure 3: An RC agent’s interactions 
 
Table 2: Stimuli, Weights and Intention 
 
 RC agent (agent i) interacting with j RC agents. Each RC agent sends a 
gent i also gains stimuli about option α from an energy supplier. If we use  PαE to 
 
Consider an
stimulus about option α (choosing an energy supplier and a metering technology) to the 
RC agent via the word-of-mouth effect (Figure 3), and the contribution of each stimulus 
to the RC agent’s subjective norm is calibrated by its relevant normative belief. We use 
different weights to represent these normative beliefs, as show in Table 2. Based on the 
TpB model, agent i subjective norm to option α can be formulated as  
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smart meter if option α includes smart metering technology (if it does not include smart 
metering technology, then PαP
ombining agent i’s subjective norm and attitude towards to option α, its intention to 
here we use a minus before the attitude towards the option because price has a 
decisioni = max {I1, I2, I3, … Iα } 
 
.4 Behaviour of ES agents 
s the ES agents are business organizations, their behaviours in a market are economic 
. The Simulation 
e programmed the model with the agent-based simulation package NetLogo 3.1.4. In 
)(* ααα SEiPi PPWA +=
∑ +−=
j
SEiPjiji PPWInfWI
1
)(*)*( ααα
S is null), and WiP to denote agent i’s sensitivity to price (a 
behavioural belief in the TpB model), agent i attitude towards option α can be 
formulated as 
 
C
choose option α can be formulated as 
 nα
 =
 
w
negative influence on the RC agent’s intention to choose option α. In a the virtual 
community, if agent i has α options, the one that can give agent i the largest intention is 
its preferred one, i.e. its final decision on whether to choose a smart meter or not and 
from which energy supplier. The decision-making can be formulated as  
 
3
 
A
activities. In our model, each ES agent’s behaviour includes: (i) promoting energy and 
smart meters to consumers by disseminating their price information throughout the 
whole virtual community; (ii) adjusting prices based on the variation of its overall 
market share (this differs in different scenarios of experiments).  
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W
terms of an RC agent’s interactions with other RC agents, we consider to two kinds 
(Figure 4). One is the RC agent’s regular interactions with its neighbouring RC agents: 
the RC agent can regularly receive influences from its neighbouring RC agents through 
regular interactions with them, and the number of regular interactions is controlled by a 
parameter called “radius”. For example, if we make the “radius” larger (a longer radius 
in Figure 4), the RC agent will have more regular interactions with its neigbouring RC 
agents. The other is the RC agent’s random interactions with other agents in the virtual 
community: the RC agent can also randomly receive influences from other agents in the 
virtual community through the random interactions with them, and the number of 
random interactions is controlled by a parameter called “random-interaction”. The 
purpose of this design is to enable the social networks in the virtual community to have 
the attributes of both “small-world” effect [27,28] and scale-free power-law 
distribution [29]. In such kind of social networks, each RC agent can both receive 
regular influences and random influences from other RC agents and send regular and 
random influences to other RC agents in the virtual community. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: An RC agent’s regular (blue) and random interactions (red) with other RC agents 
 
e simulate four scenarios. The time steps in the evolution of the four scenarios are the W
same, with each time step being defined as one month. In all the four scenarios, if an RC 
agent chooses a smart meter, it cannot switch back to a conventional meter or switch to 
the other ES agent within two time steps (simulating the 28 days rule in the energy 
market [14]). In the first scenario, we simulate one possible pilot for promoting smart 
meters in a monopoly market. An RC agent has two options in the virtual community: (i) 
conventional metering technology, and (ii) the new smart metering technology. The 
initial conditions of Scenario 1 are given in Table 3: 
 
parameter value comments 
number of ES agent y one energy supplier in the virtual community 1 There is onl
 
population-density 0.40 ere are 40% of the cells in the virtual community is populated, i.e. th
25000 (62500*0.4 = 25000) RC agents in the virtual community   
random-interaction 10 Each RC agent has less than 10 random interactions in the virtual 
community 
radius 2 Each RC agent regularly interacts with other RC agents less that 2 
times of radius away from its position 
percentage 0.10 Initially in the pilot, the ES agent randomly chooses 10% of its RC 
agents at geographically dispersed sites to install smart meters 
Tab
 
n the second scenario, we simulate a second pilot scheme for promoting smart meters 
arameter value comments 
le 3: Initial Conditions in Scenario 1 
I
in a monopoly market, with initial conditions the same as that in Scenario 1. An RC 
agent also has two options in the virtual community: (i) conventional metering 
technology, and (ii) the new smart metering technology. The only difference between 
Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 is that in Scenario 2, the ES agent chooses 10% of its RC 
agents in a centralized controlled area to install smart meters, as shown in Table 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
p
number of ES agent y one energy supplier in the virtual community 1 There is onl
 
population-density 0.40 ere are 
5000 (62500*0.4 = 25000) RC agents in the virtual community   
40% of the cells in the virtual community is populated, i.e. th
2
random-interaction 10 Each RC agent has less than 10 random interactions in the virtual 
community 
radius 2 Each RC agent regularly interacts with other RC agents less that 2 
times of radius away from its position 
percentage 0 
mart meters 
0.1 Initially in the pilot, the ES agent chooses 10% of its RC agents in a 
centralized controlled area to install s
Tab
In the third scenario, we sim arket. The two ES 
parameter value comments 
le 4: Initial Conditions in Scenario 2 
ulate a pilot scheme in a duopoly m
agents promote smart meters with cooperation, i.e. they set a unified price for smart 
meters and neither of the two will unilaterally adjust the unified price of smart meters. 
A RC agent has four options in the virtual community: (i) conventional metering 
technology with ES agent A, (ii) smart metering technology with ES agent A, (iii) 
conventional metering technology with ES agent B, and (iv) smart metering technology 
with ES agent B. The initial conditions of Scenario 3 are shown in Table 5. 
number of ES agent 2 There are two energy suppliers (A and B) in the virtual community 
 
population-density 0.40  
5000 (62500*0.4 = 25000) RC agents in the virtual community   
40% of the cells in the virtual community is populated, i.e. there are
2
market-share-A 0.50 Initially ES agent A has 50% market share 
 
market-share-B 0.50 Initially ES agent B has 50% market share 
 
random-interaction teractions in the virtual 
ommunity 
10 Each RC agent has less than 10 random in
c
radius 2 Each RC agent regularly interacts with other RC agents less that 2 
times of radius away from its position 
percentage-A 5 0.0 Initially in the pilot, the ES agent A randomly chooses 5% of its RC 
agents to install smart meters 
percentage-B 0.05 Initially in the pilot, the ES agent B randomly chooses 5% of its RC 
agents to install smart meters 
Tab
 
ulates a pilot of promoting smart meters in a duopoly 
promote smart meters with competition, i.e. they will always adjust the price of smart 
le 5: Initial Conditions in Scenario 3 
The fourth scenario also sim
market. However, it is different from Scenario 3. In Scenario 4, the two ES agents 
meters based on the variation of market shares. Every six months the two ES agents 
check their overall market shares, and if one ES agent finds that it is losing in its market 
share, it will slightly lower the price of smart meters in order to gain more RC agents; if 
it finds that its market share is increasing, it will slightly raise the price of smart meters 
in order to gain more profit. An RC agent also has four options in the virtual community: 
(i) conventional metering technology with ES agent A, (ii) smart metering technology 
with ES agent A, (iii) conventional metering technology with ES agent B, and (iv) 
smart metering technology with ES agent B. The initial conditions of Scenario 4 are 
given in Table 6. 
 
parameter value comments 
number of ES agent 2 There are two energy suppliers (A and B) in the virtual community 
 
population-density cells in the virtual community is populated, i.e. there are 0.40 40% of the 
25000 (62500*0.4 = 25000) RC agents in the virtual community   
market-share-A 0.50 itially ES agent A has 50% market share In
 
market-share-B 0.50 Initially ES agent B has 50% market share 
 
random-interaction 10 ach RC agent has less than 10 random interactions in the virtual E
community 
radius 2 ach RC agent regularly interacts with other RC agents less that 2 E
times of radius away from its position 
percentage-A 0.05 e pilot, the ES agent A randomly chooses 5% of its RC Initially in th
agents to install smart meters 
percentage-B 0.05 domly chooses 5% of its RC Initially in the pilot, the ES agent B ran
agents to install smart meters 
Tab ario 4 
 
5. Simulation Results
ents we observe the evolution of the adoption of smart 
etering technology under different conditions, which gives us possible 
le 6: Initial Conditions in Scen
 
 
Through the four experim
m
phenomenological information about the future of smart metering technology in the 
real UK energy consumer market.  
 Figure 5 from Scenario 1 shows that if the ES agent at the outset randomly and 
ispersedly chooses its RC agents to have smart meters, the smart metering technology 
the evolution of smart metering technology in a scenario of 
ooperation (Scenario 3), and Figure 9 presents the evolution of smart metering 
d
will be adopted by those RC agents outside the pilot group in a very effective way. The 
market share of smart meters evolves to around 100% in about 40 time steps. Figure 6 
from Scenario 2, however, presents a very different situation. The adoption of smart 
metering technology is very slow if the ES agent initially chooses its RC agents in a 
centralized controlled area, even though in Scenario 2 the percentage of RC agents 
initially chosen to install smart meters is the same as that in Scenario 1. Figure 7 shows 
a comparison between the evolutions of the adoption of smart metering technology in 
the two scenarios. One conclusion we can draw from the comparison is that in the pilot 
of promoting smart metering technology, choosing the initial participating RC agents 
(the RC agents who have been chosen to install smart meters at the beginning of the 
pilot programme) on a random and geographically dispersed basis is a more effective 
strategy than choosing initial participating RC agents on controlled and geographically 
centralized basis.  
 
Figure 8 presents 
c
technology in a scenario of competition (Scenario 4). Although the two scenarios are 
different, a common pattern of the adoption of smart metering technology appears. 
However, if we make a comparison between the evolutions of the adoption of smart 
metering technology in the two scenarios (Figure 10), we can find that in competition 
scenario (Scenario 4), the adoption of smart metering technology can be quicker and 
when the market reaches a stable state, smart meters in competition scenario can 
possess a larger market share than that in cooperation scenario. Moreover, Figure 12, 
Figure 13 and Figure 14 show that competition can also help an ES agent to maintain its 
overall market share, because the difference between the two ES agents’ overall market 
shares in the competition scenario is evidently smaller than that in the cooperation 
scenario. Therefore, we can draw another conclusion from the comparison: competition 
is a more effective way than cooperation in terms of both promoting smart metering 
technology and maintaining ES agents’ market shares.  
 
The model reproduces the “S-curve” model of technology diffusion [4]. The evolutions 
f the adoption of smart metering technology in all four scenarios have the common 
 interesting emergent result is the appearance of a “lock-in” effect [30]. 
he “lock-in” effect is a very interesting phenomenon in marketing. It describes a state 
o
pattern of an “S-curve” (Figure 7 and Figure 10). Our empirical observation from the 
Telegestore Project of promoting smart meters carried out by Enel in Italy also shows 
the “S-curve” model of technology adoption (Figure 15). Our simulation results show 
that the increasing rates of the four “S-curves” are different. This is due to the highly 
different management strategies (methods of choosing initial participating RC agents) 
and economic regulations (competition and cooperation). Under these different 
management strategies and economic regulations, individual RC agents have different 
perceptions (which is reflected as highly different values of “attitude towards the 
behviour”, “subjective norm” and “perceived behavioural control” in the TpB model) 
towards smart meters and energy suppliers. As a result, they have different behaviour at 
individual level (whether choose smart meters or not and with which energy supplier), 
which then gives rise to the different system level properties (different rates of the four 
“S-curves”). 
 
Another very
T
of an evolving market in which consumers prefer one of two or more competing 
products and that this preference persists for a long time beyond what would be 
economically rational [31]. The “lock-in” effect in the adoption of smart metering 
technology in our model is an emergent property of the whole virtual market which 
originates from the behaviour of individual RC agents and their interactions. Empirical 
observation from the real UK energy market shows a typical “lock-in” effect does exist 
between the major electricity suppliers (Figure 16). The appearances of the “lock-in” 
effect in different markets have attracted many marketing scientists and a huge volume 
of literature on the studies of the “lock-in” effect has been published (e.g. [32, 33]). 
However, most of them are based on traditional top-down techniques on analytical 
mathematical models. Our computational simulation model offers another way of 
generating the “lock-in” effect: based on our bottom-up agent-based model, we can 
further study how the RC agents’ interactions in the social networks contribute to the 
“lock-in” effect.  
 
 
6. Conclusions and Future Work 
t based simulation in terms of coping with 
ncertainties and complexities in the adoption of smart metering technology in the 
fusion in 
e virtual community can be seen as two validations of our model. The appearances of 
 
Our model shows the robustness of agen
u
electricity consumer market. As our results show, with the model, we can carry out 
experiments to test the effectiveness of different management strategies and economic 
regulations in the process of promoting smart metering technology. The results from the 
experiments in the virtual community might be used to infer the results in the real 
electricity market. This can help us to gain insights into the future of smart metering 
technology and optimize our management strategies and economic regulations so as 
effectively to boost the take-off of smart metering technology in the real energy market. 
For example, given that the benefits of smart meters exceed their costs, our 
experimental results can have two practical implications: if we carry out pilots to 
promote smart meters in the UK energy market, we should (i) choose the initial 
participating households on a random and geographically dispersed basis; and (ii) 
encourage competition between energy suppliers in the smart meter market.  
 
The appearance of the “lock-in” effect and “S-curve” model of technology dif
th
the “lock-in” effect and the “S-curve” enable the model to bear resemblance to 
empirical observations from real electricity markets, and further signify the validity of 
the model. Additionally, because the model is developed based upon classical 
behavioural theory, the robustness of the model can also been seen as a validation of the 
TpB model. As the TpB model is a generic behavioural theory, our model can also be 
seen as a generic reference agent-based model that can be applied to deal with other 
issues in the energy market. For example, it might be possible to separate the model 
from smart metering technology and then apply it to another issue with similar 
properties, e.g. the adoption of micro-generations in the energy market.  
 
Our further research will evaluate the effectiveness of DBERR’s new policies on 
romoting smart meters set in the new energy white paper in May 2007. These new 
 
p
policies raise some interesting issues in the energy market. For example, to what extend 
should these policies be publicized to households and how can energy suppliers take the 
advantage of initial enthusiastic smart meter users to roll our smart metering services. 
We will target these issues via agent-based computational simulation and provide 
policy implications for promoting smart metering technology in the UK energy market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
Figure 5: Scenario 1                            Figure 6: Scenario 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Evolution of SM Market Share (Scenario 1 vs Scenario 2)
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Figure 7: A Comparison between Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
Figure 8: Scenario 3 (cooperation)              Figure 9: Scenario 4 (competition) 
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Figure 10: A Comparison between Competition (Scenario 4) and Cooperation (Scenario 3) 
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Figure 11: The Evolution of SM Price in the Competition Scenario 
     
Figure 12: Market Shares of ES Agents (Scenario 3)   Figure 13: Market Shares of ES Agents (Scenario 4) 
 
 
 
 
Evoluation of Market Share (A and B, Competition vs Cooperation)
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Figure 14: A Comparison between Competition (Scenario 4) and Cooperation (Scenario 3) in ES Agents Market Shares 
 
The "S-curve" Model of Smart Metering Technology Adoption in the
Telegestore Project (Enel, Italy)
0.2
5.8
13
20.8
27.1
30
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
Nu
mb
er
 o
f 
Ho
us
eh
ol
ds
 (
Un
it
: 
M)
Number of Households
Adopting Smart Meters
 
Figure 15: The “S-curve” Model of Smart Metering Technology Adoption in the Telegestore Project (Data Source: Enel, Italy)   
 
 
 
The "Lock-in" Effect in the UK Electrcity Market
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Figure 16: The “Lock-in” Effect in the UK Electricity Market (Data Source: Domestic Retail Market Report, Ofgem, June 2007) 
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